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Abstract
Within the public choice framework, it has been argued that decentralised authority 
over the provision and financing of certain public goods and services induces competi-
tive pressure among different governmental units and consequently reduces the size of 
government. However, in many countries, fiscal decentralisation seems to have occurred 
almost exclusively through devolution of expenditure activities, without the accompany-
ing devolution of the tax authority. We address this issue in detail, and discuss the reper-
cussions of the resulting vertical fiscal imbalance on the total size of government. We also 
discuss alternative, demand-side channels of the influence of fiscal decentralisation on 
the size of government. In the empirical literature that we review, little consensus on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and the size of government is reached. 
Key words: the size of government, fiscal decentralisation, intergovernmental grants, 
sub-national expenditures, sub-national own-source revenues
Introduction1 
Fiscal decentralisation, in its purest form, presumes that sub-national governmental 
units are given the autonomy over the provision and financing of public goods and serv-
ices. In a decentralised country, sub-national governments have discretion to govern their 
own budgets without interventions from the central level. In the last few decades many 
former socialist as well as developed centralist countries have started political and fiscal 
decentralisation reforms. To a large extent, such reforms have been strengthened by the 
argument that the decentralised organisation of government brings about welfare-enhancing 
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results and makes government activities more accountable. While the stabilisation and the 
redistribution function of government are more efficient on the central level, resource al-
location efficiency can be improved if sub-national governments are given discretion to 
govern their own revenues and expenditures. It has been argued that sub-national govern-
ments are closer and more responsive to the needs and preferences of local residents, and 
that this allows a closer match between the preferences of the population and the bundle 
of public goods and services chosen by government – assuming that preferences are het-
erogeneous across different sub-national units. Consequently, sub-national tiers of gov-
ernment emerged as important players in the field of public finances. However, recent 
data on sub-national governments’ tax autonomy suggest that only a small number of 
countries are genuinely decentralised. many countries have an “incomplete” form of de-
centralisation that involves only the transfer of expenditure responsibilities to sub-nation-
al governments, without the corresponding transfer of revenue responsibilities. However, 
by definition, fiscal decentralisation goes beyond the assignment of expenditure respon-
sibilities to sub-national governments. As pointed out by Stein (1999), a crucial dimen-
sion of decentralisation is how the provision of these services is financed. Because of this 
widespread divergence between the sub-national responsibilities for expenditures and rev-
enues, decentralised countries often end up having a large degree of vertical fiscal imbal-
ance. Vertical fiscal imbalances are mostly bridged through governmental transfers from 
the central government, many of which are discretionary in nature. This practice may re-
duce the fiscal discipline of sub-national governments and result in a common pool prob-
lem. As long as central government is willing to tolerate and, more importantly, bail out 
fiscally irresponsible sub-national governments, there will be no incentive for sub-gov-
ernmental fiscal discipline, which is at the heart of fiscal decentralisation. 
While most authors agree that fiscal decentralisation brings about efficiency gains in 
the provision of public goods and services, there is no theoretical (or empirical) consen-
sus on its impact on the total size of government. 
In this paper we shed some light on this issue by providing a thorough survey of the 
empirical literature on fiscal decentralisation and the size of government. In section two, 
we discuss different transmission channels through which decentralisation is expected to 
affect the size of government. We start with the classical supply-side hypothesis; namely, 
the Leviathan hypothesis, but we also discuss the possibility that decentralisation chang-
es the demand for public goods and services. In section three, we review the relevant em-
pirical literature. In the final section, we conclude, discussing some open questions. 
 The effects of fiscal decentralisation on the size of government: theoretical 2 
considerations 
For good or ill, fiscal decentralisation is commonly thought to restrict the growth of 
government spending (Rodden, 2003). This stylised fact about the relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and the size of government is articulated in the influential work by 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980). They depict government as a monolithic Leviathan, which 
seeks to maximise revenues and increase its dimensions, through excessive rates of taxa-
tion, debt or money creation. Greater centralisation, i.e. “monopolisation” of government, 
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accompanied by a weak intergovernmental competition, is argued to lead to a larger gov-
ernment size in the economy. The rationale behind this argument is that the centralised/
monopolistic government’s position makes it easier for government to disguise and pro-
mote its selfish interests, while “deceived” taxpayers/voters have little control over such 
large and distant government. According to Brennan and Buchanan (1980) there are two 
ways to constrain the Leviathan. One way includes constitutional constraints through bal-
anced-budget provision and limitation of government access to tax and other fiscal instru-
ments. Another way is decentralisation of government’s spending and taxing powers. As-
suming that firms and citizens are mobile across jurisdictions, any attempt by one sub-
national unit to raise the “tax price” will result in a migration of its economic resources 
to an alternative sub-national unit. Because of this competitive pressure, each sub-nation-
al unit will aim at reducing the “tax price” and in consequence, given the balanced-budg-
et proposition, the supply of sub-national public goods and services. In the worst case sce-
nario, this may result in a worrisome “race to the bottom” and, consequently, under-pro-
vision of certain public goods and services. In the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) model, 
revenue generation is assumed to be independent of the demand for publicly provided 
goods and services. In other words, the presumption of government benevolence is dropped 
(Nelson, 1986), and the observed level of government expenditure in the economy is de-
termined by the supply of government expenditures. 
The original Leviathan hypothesis – “total government intrusion into the economy 
should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures 
are decentralised” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) – assumes the inseparability of tax and 
expenditure decentralisation. However, there are very few countries in the world that are 
genuinely decentralised, i.e. countries in which citizens are represented at each level of 
government and their representatives can decide on both the expenditures and taxes at 
each respective level (muller, 2003). Switzerland seems to be the only European country 
where citizens have direct influence on both expenditures and taxes at each level of gov-
ernment (Feld, kirchgassner and Schaltegger, 2003). In reality, even those countries that 
are mostly praised for being federalist cannot be credited for having absolutely limited 
central and self-financing sub-national governments. Instead, regional and local govern-
ments collude with central governments and their expenditures get funded primarily by 
intergovernmental grants, revenue-sharing programs, or other centrally controlled funds. 
This type of decentralisation, that is, expenditure decentralisation without corresponding 
tax decentralisation, is not expected to provoke the tax competition that drives the Levia-
than model. moreover, it might have the entirely opposite effect on the size of govern-
ment (Rodden, 2003). The revenue sharing schemes reduce the competitive pressure and 
result in concentration of taxing power in the hands of the revenue-maximising national 
governments (Ehdaie, 1994). It blurs the responsibility for spending decisions by dispers-
ing it among a potentially large number of different levels of government and makes con-
sumers-voters less confident about their true tax burden. It can add to the problem of the 
common pool, i.e. make it more likely for sub-central governments to impose the politi-
cal and economic costs of their spending decisions on residents outside their jurisdictions. 
To an extent, sub-national governments, aiming to maximise their own share of the “com-
mon revenue pie”, may face an incentive to overfish and, as pointed by Fiva (2006), to 
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push for higher taxes at the central level, which in turn yields expenditures with sub-na-
tionally concentrated benefits. This means that sub-national governments would behave 
as interest groups and would engage in “competition” for intergovernmental grants, rath-
er than in competition for mobile tax bases, as assumed by the Leviathan hypothesis. 
Hence, decentralisation funded by intergovernmental grants from the common revenue 
pool, for a given extent of tax revenue decentralisation, could be associated with higher 
overall government spending.
Apart from the supply-side explanation for the effect of fiscal decentralisation on the 
size of government, in the absence of a formal structural model of the size of government 
in the economy, a demand-side explanation can be easily motivated: within the conven-
tional median-voter model we can assume that government is a benevolent social-welfare 
maximiser, so that the supply of government expenditures is perfectly elastic, while the 
demand for government expenditures determines the observed level of government ex-
penditures in the economy. From this demand-side perspective we can envisage two op-
posite effects of fiscal decentralisation on the total size of government. Because fiscal de-
centralisation brings about competition among sub-national governments and results in 
more transparent decentralised budgets, it reduces the fiscal illusion of some consumers-
voters making them more aware of their true tax burden. In a genuinely decentralised 
structure of governance, consumers-voters in adjacent jurisdictions can relatively easily 
compare their relative positions and penalize their sub-national government for excessive 
and wasteful spending. To minimise the probability of not being re-elected, sub-national 
governments may want to indulge their consumers-voters and reduce the size of expen-
ditures. Consequently, we would expect government share in the economy to vary inverse-
ly with the extent of fiscal decentralization. However, alternative mechanisms may give 
the opposite results. As already pointed out, fiscal decentralisation may increase the effi-
ciency and quality of government services by tailoring them more consistently to the needs 
of consumer-voters. It may be argued that greater decentralisation enhances citizens’ trust 
in government, which allows them to demand more public goods and services, hence lead-
ing to a greater size of government. Additionally, many tiers of government imply more 
access points and politicians willing to answer to special interest groups demanding more 
government expenditures. The more decentralised political power is, the greater the po-
tential for interest group influence there is and the greater the number of interest groups 
there will be. Given these different possible channels of influence, it is not quite certain 
what differences in the size of government might be caused by more decentralisation. 
Review of the empirical literature 3 
The ongoing intensive empirical “search” for the Leviathan was initiated by Oates’s 
(1985) seminal paper. After it was published, this study was replicated by many authors, 
using different proxies for the variables of interest, different data sets – countries and time 
periods and different estimation techniques. In what follows, we give an overview of em-
pirical studies that investigate the relationship between the degree of decentralisation and 
the size of government. This topic started to preoccupy economists’ minds long time ago 
and has resulted in a large number of empirical studies. We would by no means claim that 
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this is a fully comprehensive list of studies, but we believe that the cited studies are among 
the most relevant (Table 1 in Appendix). 
In the pioneering study, Oates (1985) failed to find the Leviathan in the sample of the 
48 US contiguous states as well as in the sample of 43 developed and developing coun-
tries. Within the US, Oates (1985) tests for the significance of the effect of decentralisa-
tion on the state government level, while in the cross-country analysis he focuses on the 
total general government level. In both cases, none of the (de)centralisation variables used 
exerted a statistically significant effect that would lend support to the Leviathan hypoth-
esis. Employing rather similar measures of government size and decentralisation, Nelson 
(1986) also finds no evidence in support of the Leviathan hypothesis for the state govern-
ments in the US. He does provide, however, some evidence that a greater number of rel-
atively homogeneous sub-state governmental units exert a constraining effect on the level 
of state revenues. As a note, we point to the measure of government size used in Oates 
(1985) and Nelson (1986) and potential problems related to it. Namely, the relative size 
of government in both studies is measured in terms of tax receipts. Although there is no 
single best measure that would reflect all the activities undertaken by the government, the 
majority of the studies in this field use the share of government expenditures (rather than 
tax receipts or revenues) in the total economy. It could be argued that measures of gov-
ernment size defined in terms of total expenditures reflect a more complete and meaning-
ful measure of total resources absorption by government than those using revenue-based 
measure. Namely, total government expenditures can be financed from several sources – 
directly and/or indirectly, through money creation, inflation, debt. While Oates (1985), 
Nelson (1986), Forbes and Zampelli (1989), Feld, kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003), 
and Prohl and Schneider (2009) use revenue-based measures of government size, all other 
studies reviewed in this paper employ the expenditure-based measure for the construction 
of dependent variable. A noticeable exception is martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) where 
the size of government is measured by the number of public sector employees – this is a 
somewhat different, but not unusual practice within the government sector literature. 
An empirical proof of the Leviathan hypothesis, i.e. a negative statistically signifi-
cant relationship between decentralisation and the size of government, is found in mar-
low (1988). The main difference between marlow (1988) and the two previous studies is 
the level of analysis. Whereas Oates (1985) and Nelson (1986) investigate the behaviour 
of the state government level – measured by state and local tax revenues as a share of per-
sonal income/per capita – in response to changes in the degree of decentralisation, mar-
low (1988) focuses on the total general government size – the sum of state, local and fed-
eral government expenditure as a percentage of GNP – as a measure that better suits the 
wording “total government intrusion” in the Leviathan hypothesis (marlow, 1988). Using 
data on aggregate US government expenditures from 1946 to 1985, he shows that in-
creased levels of fiscal decentralization – measured as state and local government spend-
ing relative to total government spending – lead to a smaller government size. Using the 
same sample, Grossman (1989) confirms marlow’s results. In the decentralisation – gov-
ernment size relationship, Grossman (1989) emphasises the role of intergovernmental 
grants, which are supposed to encourage expansion of government size by concentrating 
taxing power in the national government and by weakening the fiscal discipline imposed 
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on sub-national governments for the financing of their own expenditures. He empirically 
confirms that vertical fiscal imbalance – measured by the share of federal grants to state 
and local governments in total state and local receipts – increases the size of government, 
measured by the total government expenditures relative to GNP. To summarise, Gross-
man’s (1989) results do support the Leviathan hypothesis and explicitly point to govern-
ment size-enhancing effect of intergovernmental transfers. Shadbegian (1999) builds on 
marlow (1988) and Grossman (1989), but in addition to the general government level, he 
extends the analysis to include the federal government and the state government levels. 
He shows that, as suggested by the Leviathan hypothesis, fiscal decentralization – meas-
ured by state and local government own-purpose expenditure relative to total government 
expenditures – causes decreased expenditure by total and federal governments. At the 
same time, as fiscal decentralization increases, state and local public expenditures increase, 
but this increase is more than offset by the decrease in federal government expenditures, 
hence total general government decreases as a reaction to fiscal decentralisation. Shadbe-
gian (1999) also shows that intergovernmental transfers lead to an increase in overall gov-
ernment expenditures and an increase in expenditures at each individual level of govern-
ment, confirming that collusion among the different levels of government weakens the 
disciplining power of fiscal federalism. Contrary to the studies that argue in favour of a 
more aggregate level of analysis, Forbes and Zampelli (1989) explain that the county level 
of government provides the most reasonable setting for examining the Leviathan hypoth-
esis since citizen mobility, as an important prerequisite for inter-jurisdictional competi-
tion, should be evident at a relatively local level. They estimate a single equation model 
using data for 345 counties in 157 Standard metropolitan Statistical Areas (SmSAs) to 
test the hypothesis that county government (own) revenues (per capita/per personal in-
come) should be lower in those metropolitan areas with a larger number of competing 
county governments. The results, pretty much in line with Oates (1985) and Nelson (1986), 
suggest that at the county level of government, Leviathan is a “mythical” beast. Joulfaian 
and marlow (1990, 1991) are critical of all cross-sectional studies of the decentralization 
hypothesis that fail to include the federal sector in the measure of the size of government. 
Thus, in their studies on the American states, Joulfaian and marlow (1990, 1991) meas-
ure government size by including disaggregated federal government expenditures on a 
state-by-state basis. The main finding is that the size of government and the level of de-
centralization are inversely related, as predicted by the Leviathan hypothesis. 
The US government finance data have been widely exploited for the intra-national 
analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and the size of government in 
the US. Other intra-national studies, such as Grossman and West (1994) and Feld, kirch-
gässner and Schaltegger (2003), search for the Leviathan in Canada and Switzerland. Feld, 
kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) investigate different channels of influence of fiscal 
federalism on the size and structure of revenues of Swiss cantons using the data for 26 
Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998. They find that fiscal decentralization – measured by 
the share of local in cantonal and state government revenues – has a statistically signifi-
cant negative effect on the size of cantons – measured by the cantonal and local govern-
ment revenues per capita. This revenue-reducing effect of fiscal decentralization, as ar-
gued by Feld, kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003), originates primarily from the consid-
59
S. Golem: Fiscal decentralisation and the size of government: a review of the empirical literature
Financial Theory and Practice 34 (1) 53-69 (2010)
erable tax autonomy and tax power granted to the cantons by the constitution and supports 
the Leviathan hypothesis. Building on Shadbegian (1999), Grossman and West (1994) 
employ Canadian time series data on general, federal, provincial, and local government 
expenditures and find evidence in support of the Leviathan hypothesis for total and fed-
eral government, but not for the provincial level of government. moreover, they find ev-
idence that collusion among separate governmental units – measured as the level of inter-
governmental grants from higher level to lower level governments – increases the size of 
each level of government, thereby suggesting that it can weaken the discipline of fiscal 
federalism. 
The evidence from the cited intra-national studies of the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and government size – in particular, for American states, Swiss cantons 
and Canadian provinces – is rather mixed and inconclusive. Unfortunately, it seems that 
also cross-country studies do not shed much light. 
Ehdaie (1994) tests the Leviathan hypothesis using international cross-country data, 
divided into two samples – sample 1 consists of 30 countries in 1987, while sample 2 
counts 26 countries in 1977. To ensure that the measure of fiscal decentralisation used in 
his study accounts for the simultaneous decentralisation of the national government’s tax-
ing and spending powers to sub-national governments, Ehdaie (1994) employs the GFS’s 
ratio of sub-national governments’ own-source revenues to total government expenditures. 
However, for the reasons explained in the subsequent sections, this measure does not sat-
isfactory reflect the inseparability of revenue-raising and spending responsibilities at the 
sub-national level of government. To control for the level of collusion among governmen-
tal units, he includes the ratio of the central government’s revenues transferred to sub-na-
tional governments over total government expenditures. Failing to control for the collu-
sion, he argues, would lead to biased estimates for decentralization, and consequently to 
confounded conclusions and policy recommendations, particularly in countries where 
intergovernmental transfers compose a large portion of sub-national budget. Hence, draw-
ing on Grossman (1989), Ehdaie (1994) explicitly explores Brennan and Buchanan’s 
(1980) caveat that the possibility of collusion among different units of governments should 
be included among “other things equal”. Findings of this study lend support to the Levi-
athan hypothesis since the coefficient on the decentralisation variable proves to be statis-
tically significant and negative. In line with a priori expectations, fiscal collusion has the 
opposite, albeit statistically insignificant effect. The effect of collusion is thoroughly ex-
amined in Stein (1999) on Latin American cross-country data, averaged for the 1990-1995 
period. The problem of vertical fiscal imbalance, which is typically bridged through the 
use of transfers from the central government, may weaken the budget constraints of the 
sub-national governments, unless, as pointed by Stein (1999), these intergovernmental 
transfers are very strictly defined, with resources allocated according to objective criteria 
and with little room for discretionality and bargaining between the different levels of gov-
ernment. If such conditions are not satisfied, sub-national governments may have an in-
centive to over-borrow and over-spend, and then shift the burden onto the central govern-
ment and other governmental units. Consequently, in the empirical model, Stein (1999) 
uses different decentralisation variables – either expenditure decentralisation or the inter-
active variables: the product of expenditure decentralisation and vertical imbalance, the 
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product of expenditure decentralisation, vertical imbalance and sub-national governments’ 
borrowing autonomy, the product of expenditure decentralisation, vertical imbalance and 
discretionality in transfers. Not only do Stein’s results (1999) indicate that decentralised 
governments tend to be larger, but also, quite expectedly, that the size of government de-
pends on the form of decentralisation – arrangements more likely to lead to soft budget 
constraints seem to be associated with larger size. Jin and Zou (2002) examine how dif-
ferent levels of government – general, national and sub-national – behave in response to 
expenditure decentralisation, revenue decentralisation and vertical fiscal imbalance, using 
the panel of 32 developed and developing countries over the period 1980-1994. Broadly, 
the main results suggest that expenditure decentralization leads to smaller national gove-
rnments, larger sub-national governments, and larger total general governments. Revenue 
decentralization, on the other hand, increases sub-national governments by less than it re-
duces national governments, hence leads to smaller aggregate governments. Finally, ver-
tical imbalance tends to increase the size of total, as well as of national and sub-national, 
governments. 
The standard source of data on revenue and expenditure shares for sub-national rela-
tive to total government is the ImF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). To a large ex-
tent, this is because until recently it has been the only official source of this type of data. 
However, despite being consistent and operational, as pointed by Fiva (2006), this data 
set fails to address properly the intergovernmental fiscal structure of countries. Although 
the GFS database keeps track of certain types of grants and various forms of own source 
sub-national revenue, it fails to distinguish between tax revenues that are legislated and 
collected locally from those that accrue to the sub-national governments automatically 
through revenue-sharing schemes (Rodden, 2003). Consequently, it tends to overestimate 
sub-national revenue autonomy. It is also likely to overestimate the true nature of spend-
ing autonomy, since the figures on sub-national expenditures also include those expendi-
tures that are funded by intergovernmental grants, mandated by the central government 
or spent on behalf of the central government. A country may formally allocate a large part 
of the national government budget to the sub-national level, but this does not necessarily 
mean that sub-national governments are granted autonomy over decisions regarding those 
expenditures and revenues. Consequently, the estimators and findings of the studies em-
ploying this dataset might be misleading, since intergovernmental grants or some other 
revenue sharing arrangements between sub-central and central governments are not ex-
plicitly accounted for. Aiming to cope with this deficiency, OECD researchers are mak-
ing an effort to refine the measure of revenue decentralisation by classifying taxes in terms 
of the degree of autonomy they provide to sub-national governments. Stegarescu (2005) 
goes a step further – he draws on the OECD’s analytical framework and expands the data 
set to cover 23 OECD countries from 1965 to 2001. He distinguishes between different 
types of sub-national government revenues according to the degree of discretion sub-na-
tional governments are granted in determining them autonomously. As pointed out by Ste-
garescu (2005), a system where sub-national levels of government have real autonomy to 
determine the allocation of their expenditures or to raise their own revenue is more de-
centralised than a different system in which sub-national government expenditures and 
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revenues are determined by national legislation, even though the formal assignment of 
functions or revenues might be the same. 
Rodden (2003) uses both the GFS and the OECD improved data set to demonstrate 
that the effect of decentralisation on government size is conditioned by the nature of fis-
cal federalism. most interestingly, his preliminary examination of the OECD’s ratio of 
revenue from own taxes that are actually controlled by sub-national governments to total 
sub-national revenue indicates that full tax decentralisation is more unusual than is com-
monly thought. Results from a somewhat limited data set consisting of 1985-1995 aver-
ages for 19 OECD countries suggest that decentralisation, when funded primarily by au-
tonomous local taxation, is associated with smaller government. On the other hand, when 
funded by revenue sharing, grants, or centrally regulated sub-national taxation, fiscal de-
centralisation is associated with larger government. In the same study, Rodden (2003) ex-
tends the number of countries to a sample of 44 countries for the period 1978-1997, but 
at the expense of employing less satisfactory GFS data on fiscal decentralisation. The re-
sults obtained using this particular data set and data source, also indicated that decentral-
isation funded by direct intergovernmental transfers is associated with larger government. 
It seems that when central governments increase transfers to sub-national governments, 
they do not reduce their own direct expenditures, while sub-national governments spend 
all they receive through increased transfers. Fiva (2006) employs the Stegarescu (2005) 
“purified” measure of revenue decentralisation; that is, the share of sub-national govern-
ment autonomous own revenues – only those where the sub-national government has dis-
cretion over tax rate, tax base or both – in total general government revenues. From a 
cross-country perspective, the findings in Fiva (2006) suggest that tax decentralisation is 
associated with a smaller government sector, lending support to the Leviathan hypothe-
sis. Expenditure decentralisation, on the other hand, is associated with a larger govern-
ment sector. Prohl and Schneider (2009) study the effect of decentralization on the growth 
of government size for a panel of 29 countries over the 1978-2003 period. They employ 
two different proxy variables of fiscal decentralization – the “classical” GFS measure of 
expenditure and revenue decentralisation and their own index of fiscal federalism. Their 
index of fiscal federalism incorporates the fiscal and administrative autonomy that con-
stitutional and statutory law grants to sub-national governments. It varies from zero (for 
low fiscal autonomy) to six (for high fiscal autonomy) and is highly correlated with the 
degree of expenditure and revenue decentralization as measured by the GFS data. The re-
sults indicate that the growth of government, measured either by the share of government 
expenditures or revenues in GDP, is inversely influenced by each of the decentralisation 
variables – the GFS’s expenditure and revenue sub-national government shares and the 
Prohl and Schneider (2009) index of fiscal federalism. 
Although still heterogeneous, the results of the cross-country studies seem to offer 
more empirical support for the Leviathan hypothesis than the intra-national studies. It is 
possible that a part of this discrepancy is due to differences in the design of the studies 
themselves and econometric techniques used. While the intra-national studies mainly em-
ploy single-year snapshots, cross-section averages or single-country time-series data, in 
the cross-national studies authors in general take advantage of both cross-section and time-
series dimension of the data at hand. mostly, they use panel data analysis techniques and 
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estimators that are, unlike the classical ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, robust to 
some of the specification problems frequently encountered in this kind of analysis. Given 
the dynamic nature of both fiscal decentralisation and government size, the better analy-
sis of dynamic adjustment that panel data allow (kennedy, 2008) is certainly one of the 
most important advantages of this type of data. However, since modelling dynamics typi-
cally involves including a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable, unless 
the time-series dimension of the data set is very large, pooled OLS, fixed-effect (FE) and 
random-effects (RE) estimators are biased. Additionally, the problem of a reverse causa-
tion in the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and government size as another 
source of endogeneity seems to be avoided by the authors, either by being neglected com-
pletely or only mentioned in passing. Among the reviewed studies, Rodden (2003), Feld, 
kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) and martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) address this 
problem more explicitly. In order to tackle the problem of possible endogeneity of the de-
centralization variable, Feld, kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) and martinez-Vazquez 
and Yao (2009) use the two-stage least square (2SLS) procedure. As suitable instrumen-
tal variables – uncorrelated with the error term and correlated with the potentially endog-
enous decentralisation variable – Feld, kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) use lags of 
the original decentralization variable, while martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) use ethnic, 
language and religion fractionalisation indices. Rodden (2003) uses several different es-
timators, including the Arellano-Bond generalised method of moments (Gmm), where 
internal instruments for the potentially endogenous variables are created and used.
We have already pointed out the insufficient attention that has been given to differ-
ent forms of fiscal decentralisation in empirical studies. This may add to the explanation 
of the heterogeneity of empirical results. The majority of the intra-national as well as a 
large part of cross-country studies measure decentralisation by the fraction of sub-nation-
al expenditures (or revenues) from total government expenditures (or revenues). Howe-
ver, it might make a difference for the estimation results if an author uses a revenue or ex-
penditure measure of the extent of decentralisation. moreover, it might make a difference 
if an author uses own-source revenue or an aggregate accounting revenue measure. If de-
centralisation is to have a constraining effect on the size of government it must occur on 
both the expenditure and the revenue side (Rodden, 2003). Hence, a reliable measure of 
fiscal decentralisation needs to effectively quantify the activities of sub-central govern-
ments arising from their full autonomous decisions (Fiva, 2005). The non-existence of 
such a measure partly justifies this malpractice by some authors, particularly by those who 
were among the first to explore this topic empirically. Efforts put in by OECD research-
ers and authors such as Stegarescu (2005) and Prohl and Schneider (2009), enable repli-
cation and a more precise re-estimation of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and government size, with a measure of fiscal decentralisation that better reflects its the-
oretical counterpart. 
In the absence of a fully specified model of the size of government in the economy, 
researchers typically estimate reduced-form equations using explanatory variables that 
other studies have found to be of significance in explaining the size of the government 
sector. The standard approach is to regress some measure of government size on some 
measure of fiscal decentralisation and a set of control variables, such as income, popula-
tion, a country’s openness, the age dependency ratio, unemployment rate, and some po-
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litical variables that are a priori expected to have an effect on the total size of government 
in the economy. 
Conclusion4 
An argument supportive of decentralisation is that it increases allocative efficiency 
since sub-national governments, which are closer and more responsive to the needs and 
preferences of local residents, are given discretion to govern their own affairs. It has also 
been argued that a decentralised provision and financing of public services induces com-
petitive pressure among different governmental units, consequently reducing inefficiency 
and waste in the public sector and the total size of tax burden and government expendi-
tures. In this light, transitional economies are regularly advised to pursue decentralised 
organisation of government activities as a means to reduce the overall size of government 
and stimulate development of their economies. Nonetheless, economists are still strug-
gling to give a clear-cut theoretical explanation of the effect of decentralisation on the size 
of government, and the empirical results are mixed. 
Until recently, studies that examined the relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and the size of government typically employed accounting measures of either revenue or 
spending shares for sub-national relative to general government as a proxy for fiscal de-
centralisation, irrespective of whether sub-national governments actually have discretion 
over those assigned functions or revenues. Since fiscal decentralisation seems to have oc-
curred almost exclusively through increased grants and shared revenues rather than the 
devolution of expenditure and tax authority in the majority of countries (Rodden, 2003), 
those two measures do not capture accurately the phenomenon of fiscal decentralisation. 
It is only recent studies, such as Ehdaie (1994), Stein (1999), Jin and Zou (2002), Rodden 
(2003), Stegarescu (2005), Fiva (2006), Prohl and Schneider (2009), that take the distinc-
tion between spending decentralisation, revenue decentralisation and intergovernmental 
grants seriously. In general, these studies point out the asymmetric effect of the two meas-
ures of decentralisation – expenditure decentralisation is found to increase the total size 
of government, while own-source revenue decentralisation has the opposite effect. This 
dichotomy of effects suggests that decentralisation has to include both the expenditure-
based and the revenue-based activities of the sub-national governments to have a con-
straining effect on the total size of government in the economy. If not, a common pool 
problem may arise. It may reduce the competitive pressure on sub-national governments 
for mobile economic resources, while leaving the total effect of fiscal decentralisation on 
the size of government indecisive a priori. 
All in all, in the empirical literature, little consensus has emerged on the effect of fis-
cal decentralisation and the size of government. Hence, as a concluding remark, we cite 
an observation by Rodden (2003) – “those who are alarmed that the global trend toward 
fiscal decentralisation entails dangerous tax competition have little to fear, and those who 
envision smaller, more efficient government have little to celebrate”. 
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